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ABSTRACT
This article aims to investigate the long-term performance of a portfolio of firms that announced the repurchase of their 
own stocks in the Brazilian market from 2003 to 2014. Open market stock repurchase is a means to distribute cashflow to 
shareholders. Some of the reasons for a firm to buy back its own stocks are: to adjust its capital structure; to reduce excessive 
cash levels; as an alternative to dividends; and signaling to the market in order to reduce information asymmetry between 
the firm and its investors. If the signaling hypothesis is true, then forming a portfolio with shares that announce repurchases 
generates abnormal returns in the long run. Our results show that repurchase announcements in the open market signal stock 
underpricing, and abnormal returns can be earned using this strategy. Results are inconsistent with the semi-strong form 
of the efficient markets hypothesis, which states that one cannot earn abnormal returns with publicly available information. 
We obtained abnormal returns using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and Fama and French three-factor model. 
Additionally, we divided the sample in growth and value firms. We found that the average abnormal return for firms that 
announce repurchase programs ranges from 5.4% to 7.9% for up to a 3-year period after the announcement. For value 
companies (more likely to repurchase stocks due to undervaluation), abnormal returns can reach up to 11.5% per year.
Keywords: open market stock repurchase, abnormal returns, information, underreaction, long-term returns.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A company can distribute cashflow to its shareholders 
by paying dividends or repurchasing part of its outstanding 
stocks. In stock repurchase, companies decide to use their 
cash resources to acquire their own stocks in the market. 
Stock repurchase programs are allowed in Brazil since 
1976, by Laws No. 6385, of December 7, 1976 (1976) and 
No. 6,404, December 15, 1976 (1976). However, it was with 
the advance of time, the popularization of the financial 
market, and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Brazil (CVM) Instruction No. 299 (1999), that these 
repurchase programs began to gain attention in terms of 
the number of events announced and traded quantity.
In Brazil, two stock repurchase methods can be used. 
The first is tender offer (OPA), i.e., managers define the 
number of stocks the company intends to repurchase, 
the offer expiration date and the price it intends to pay. 
This method is used, among other reasons, to delist a 
company, or for control acquisition or disposition. The 
second method, which is the subject of this study, consists 
of the repurchase by the company of its own shares in the 
open market. In this method, the company repurchases 
its shares in the market, like any investor, and is subject to 
a few legal restrictions, e.g., on total repurchase volume.
Several reasons can explain a firm’s interest in buying 
back its own stocks: (i) the firm’s desire to adjust its capital 
structure (Hovakimian, Opler & Titman, 2001); (ii) its 
necessity to reduce excessive cash levels (Jensen, 1986); 
(iii) as an alternative to dividends payment (Grullon & 
Michaely, 2002); or (iv) signaling to the market in order 
to reduce information asymmetry between the firm and 
its investors (Vermaelen, 1981).
The market tends to consider the company’s stock 
repurchase announcement as a sign that managers believe 
its stocks are undervalued or, at least, not overvalued 
(Vermaelen, 1981). If investors believe that managers 
are better informed about the future prospects of their 
companies and that they act in the best interest of their 
shareholders, then the market will react favorably to the 
repurchase plan announcement, and the new stock price 
will likely reflect the true value of the new information.
Depending on investors’ interpretation of the event 
caused by the repurchase plan announcement, stock 
prices will adjust upwards or downwards. In efficient 
financial markets, firms’ stock prices reflect the general 
consensus on all available information about the economy, 
the financial markets, and the company itself, i.e., that 
information is incorporated into stock prices. Therefore, 
if the interpretation made about the stock repurchase 
program is that shares are worth less than they should be, 
they will likely appreciate. Thus, if this new equilibrium 
price is actualized in a non-biased manner, there would 
be no wealth transfer between long-term shareholders 
and those who sold their stocks back to the company.
A pertinent question is whether the market correctly 
incorporates into prices the new information the company 
provides as it announces a stock repurchase program. 
If the market does so, then we will likely observe that 
prices after the announcement are unbiased and that 
the profitability to be achieved in the long run will not 
be higher than expected for the company’s risk level. 
Otherwise, if managers are right in making the repurchase 
decision, then these companies’ stocks will be a great 
investment for their long-term shareholders. This question 
is the main motivation for this study.
The international literature on stock repurchase has 
different approaches. The first one investigates the reasons 
that drive companies to conduct repurchase programs 
(Brav, Graham, Harvey & Michaely, 2005; Chan, Ikenberry 
& Lee, 2004; Dittmar, 2000). The second is formed by 
studies about the kinds of change occurring after the 
announcements, both in operational and financial terms 
(Bartov, 1991; Grullon & Michaely, 2004; Lie, 2005). There 
are also studies which test the profitability of investment 
strategies based on repurchase announcements or actual 
repurchases (Dittmar & Field, 2015; Ikenberry, Lakonishok 
& Vermaelen, 1995, Ishikawa & Takahashi, 2011, Yook, 
2010). This article falls under this last strand.
The results of empirical studies conducted in Brazil 
on stock repurchase program announcements show that, 
in most tests performed, there are positive abnormal 
returns in the days following the announcement date 
(Gabrielli & Saito, 2004; Lima, Gratz, Silva & Carvalho, 
2012; Moreira, 2000). However, research conducted 
with data from the Brazilian market analyzed share 
repurchase programs from a short-term perspective. 
The present study analyzed the subject from a long-term 
perspective and found that portfolios formed by shares 
of companies that announced the repurchase of their 
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own shares showed abnormal annual returns ranging 
from 5.4 to 7.9% for investment horizons in a one- to 
three-year calendar-time strategy. In the year prior to the 
repurchase program announcements, the same portfolios 
did not show abnormal returns statistically different from 
0, indicating that abnormal positive returns only occurred 
after the announcements. These results are in line with 
Ikenberry et al. (1995), who found abnormal annual 
returns of 4% using a similar portfolio-building strategy 
with data from announcements of companies in the U.S. 
market. In addition, using Canadian data, Ikenberry et 
al. (2000) found abnormal annual returns ranging from 
7.3 to 8.7%. 
Value companies are more likely to have undervalued 
stocks (Dittmar, 2000; Zhang, 2005). Therefore, these 
companies would be more likely to show superior 
performance in the long run. By separating firms in two 
groups, i.e., value and growth, we found evidence that 
corroborates this argument. Zhang (2005) found that a 
portfolio of value companies in the Hong Kong market 
which repurchased their own stocks generated positive 
abnormal returns compared to a portfolio of companies 
that were similar in terms of size and book-to-market 
ratio, but did not repurchase. We also compared the 
abnormal returns of value and growth firms against control 
portfolios for each of these two groups and found that the 
abnormal returns of value-type firms were significantly 
higher than the control sample. We did not find the same 
result for growth-type companies.
This study is the first to measure long-term abnormal 
returns for an investment strategy with companies that 
announced stock repurchase programs in the Brazilian 
market. We intend to fill a gap by examining whether the 
managers of listed companies in Brazil who made the 
decision to announce stock repurchase programs were 
signaling to the market that their stocks were undervalued. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: 
Section 2 presents an overview of stock repurchases in 
Brazil, Section 3 describes the methodology used in the 
study, Section 4 presents and discusses the study’s findings, 
and Section 5 concludes the article.
2. STOCK REPURCHASE IN BRAZIL
2.1 Types of Stock Repurchase
In Brazil, there are two stock repurchase methods: 
tender offer (OPA) and stock repurchases in the open 
market. An OPA is sometimes called a ‘fixed-price 
tender’. It is an operation where management defines 
the number of stocks it intends to repurchase, the offer 
expiration date and the offer price, which is usually set 
at a premium in relation to the current market price. 
This instrument is mandatory in the following cases: 
company delisting (when it becomes privately traded); to 
increase the controlling shareholder’s stake in the equity 
of a public company; or for disposition of control. It can 
be voluntarily used to acquire stocks issued by another 
public company or to acquire its control. An OPA can also 
be of the parallel type, i.e., made by a third party other 
than the offeror or person related to it and concerning 
stocks covered by an OPA that has already been filed for 
registration with the CVM, or by a registration-exempt 
OPA in progress. An OPA will mandatorily include an 
appraisal report.
The second method, i.e., open-market share 
repurchase, is the object of this study. It is an operation 
in which the company buys back its own stocks in the 
stock market, like any ordinary investor. By repurchasing, 
the company acquires stocks to keep in its own treasury 
in order to retire (cancel) them or for later disposition. 
The acquisition, pursuant to CVM Instruction No. 
10 (1980), is prohibited when it: (i) causes a decrease in 
the firm’s equity; (ii) requires using funds greater than the 
amount in the balance of profits and available reserves 
according to the last balance sheet; (iii) creates, by action 
or omission, directly or indirectly, artificial conditions 
of stock demand, supply or price, or involves unfair 
practices; (iv) involves unpaid stocks or stocks owned 
by the controlling shareholder; and (v) when a tender 
offer is in progress.
Authorizing an open-market stock repurchase does 
not require registering the transaction with the CVM. 
The company’s board of directors is responsible for the 
authorization, and it is obliged to report it immediately 
to the CVM and the stock exchange where the stocks will 
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be traded. Disclosure to the market is made through a 
material fact, and the company must specify at least the 
following information: (i) the company’s purpose in the 
operation; (ii) the amount of stocks to be acquired or 
disposed; (iii) the deadline for conducting the authorized 
transactions – which may not exceed 365 days; (iv) the 
number of outstanding stocks, pursuant to the instruction; 
(v) name and address of the financial institutions that will 
be the intermediaries.
The stocks’ acquisition price may not be above the 
market price, so as to prevent price manipulation. The 
amount of stocks held in treasury by the company may 
not exceed 10% of each class of stocks outstanding, 
and this percentage includes shares held in treasury by 
subsidiaries and affiliates. This restriction is meant to 
avoid manipulation in stock demand and liquidity. The 
company that announces a stock repurchase program 
is not obliged to buy back the amount announced. It 
may purchase part of it or even none at all, without 
any penalty.
2.2 Legislation 
It was not until 1976 that it became possible for 
companies in Brazil to repurchase their own stocks in the 
market. Law No. 6385, of December 7, 1976 (1976), which 
regulates the securities market and creates the CVM, gave 
this agency the jurisdiction to issue regulations applying 
to publicly traded companies on stock repurchase and 
treasury stock disposition [pursuant to Decree No. 3995, 
of October 31, 2001 (2001)]. Law No. 6404, of December 
15, 1976 (1976) establishes, among others, the possibility 
for companies to acquire their own shares to keep them 
in treasury, retire them, or for later disposition. This law 
also extends to any company the right to repurchase 
their own shares, hitherto restricted to authorized capital 
companies, according with Law No. 4728, of July 14, 
1965 (1965).
However, it was not until CVM Instruction No. 
10 (1980) that the subject of stock repurchase was treated 
more specifically. This instruction sets the limit for the 
amount of stocks that may be held in treasury, a limit 
which was more recently altered by CVM Instruction 
No. 268 (1997), which established that treasury stocks 
may not exceed 10% of each class of stocks outstanding. 
CVM Instruction No. 390 (2003) alters CVM Instruction 
n. 10 (1980) with regard to the trading of stocks by the 
same public companies that issued them, by means of 
transactions involving options.
CVM Instruction No. 299 (1999) regulates information 
disclosure both on the disposition of controlling shares of 
stock and growth in the stakes of controlling shareholders, 
managers or audit board members. It adds rules on the 
trading by companies of their own stocks, as well as on 
tender offers. According to Gabrielli and Saito (2004, p. 
63), “before CVM Instruction No. 299 (1999) was issued, 
the market used to punish companies that repurchased 
their own shares and, after it was issued, the market began 
to evaluate positively the companies that announced stock 
repurchase programs”.
The results of the study by Gabrielli and Saito (2004) 
showed that the cumulative abnormal returns were positive 
and significant after CVM Instruction No. 299 (1999) 
was issued. Before, stocks showed an average of total 
accumulated losses of almost 10% within 45 days of the 
repurchase announcement. This instruction hindered the 
so-called “informal delisting”, i.e., the gradual purchase 
of stocks from minority shareholders. This meant that 
the remaining outstanding stocks lost liquidity, leaving 
minority shareholders no choice but to sell their stakes at 
low prices. However, CVM Instruction No. 299/1999 was 
revoked by CVM Instruction no. 361 (2002). The latter 
was updated by CVM Instructions No. 436 (2006), No. 
480 (2009) and No. 487 (2010), which dealt primarily 
with OPA rules and procedures.
2.3 Why Do Companies Repurchase Their Own 
Stocks? 
There are several known reasons for a company to 
make the decision of repurchasing its own shares in 
the market. The reasons covered in this section are not 
mutually exclusive, and a company may launch a stock 
repurchase program for combined reasons.
According to Dittmar (2000), Grullon and Ikenberry 
(2000), Gabrielli and Saito (2004) and various other 
authors, the main reasons for companies to repurchase 
their own shares are: (i) when they wish to make 
adjustments in their capital structure; (ii) to reduce agency 
costs on the company’s cash flows; (iii) as a substitute 
for paying dividends; e (iv) as a means of signaling to 
the market.
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2.3.1 Capital structure adjustments.
If the company is not satisfied with its capital structure, 
i.e., if it feels the relationship between third-party stakes 
and its own is not adequate, it may choose to buy back 
its stocks in the market. When the company withdraws 
part of its equity from the market, it increases its degree 
of financial leverage. However, effects on the degree of 
leverage of companies will not be perceptible unless 
the buyback takes place via an OPA. This is because 
in an open-market buyback, the company is subject to 
repurchase limits that cause the repurchase to occur 
in very small amounts, which hardly changes the level 
of indebtedness. Only a long-term sequence of stock 
buyback programs could lead to significant changes in 
the company’s financial leverage.
2.3.2 Reducing agency costs on free cash flows.
The companies that run the greatest risk of 
overinvesting (or making investments that are beneficial 
to management, to the detriment of shareholders) are the 
ones with greatest excess of resources, particularly cash. 
According to Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986), one 
way to prevent management from improperly using cash 
flows is to return the money to shareholders, either by 
paying dividends or repurchasing outstanding shares.
According to Li e McNally (2007), the companies that 
are most likely to repurchase their own stocks are the ones 
with the highest level of free cash flows, lowest market-to-
book ratio, worst stock price performance, and the ones 
whose insiders have the greatest stakes. In Brazil, Mota 
(2007) found that the largest companies, least concerned 
with corporate governance, which distribute the largest 
amounts of dividends and have the greatest liquidity, are 
the ones that conduct buyback programs most.
2.3.3 Dividend substitution.
The results of the study of Grullon and Michaely 
(2002) showed that stock repurchases came to use the 
resources that used to serve to increase the value of the 
distributed dividend. Their figures show that dividend 
payout rate declined from 21.4% in 1972 to 11.4% in 2000, 
and that the part of the profit used for stock repurchases 
rose from 2.8% in 1972 to 12.4% in 2000. These figures 
show an increase in stock repurchase, while maintaining 
shareholder cash distribution rate relatively constant. 
These results corroborate the hypothesis of dividend 
substitution.
2.3.4 Signaling.
The information asymmetry between management 
and investors may cause stock prices to fail to accurately 
reflect the good news about a company’s future prospects. 
Thus, its market value will be traded below what is deemed 
to be its fair value. According to Grullon and Ikenberry 
(2000), managers could try to eliminate this discrepancy 
by informing investors of the good news they have about 
their companies’ future prospects (e.g., concerning the 
companies’ ability to generate future cash flows, increase 
profitability, etc.). However, mere announcements may 
not be very reliable. In that case, the company needs to 
send signals that reinforce this optimism, and one way of 
providing this signaling is by purchasing its own stocks 
in the market.
According to this hypothesis, companies that announce 
the repurchase of their own shares should experience 
future increases in indices such as profitability and cash 
flow generation. Vermaelen (1981) and Dann, Masulis, 
and Mayers (1991) tested this hypothesis using a sample 
of stock repurchases via fixed-price tender and found 
evidence of positive abnormal annual profits in the years 
following the stock repurchases. Hertzel and Jain (1991) 
found that analysts revised their profit per share forecasts 
upwards after stock repurchase announcements. Lie and 
McConnell (1998) used samples of announcements of 
repurchase via fixed-price tender and Dutch auction, and 
found that in both cases, the companies’ future profits 
increased following the announcement. Additionally, the 
authors found no significant difference between increases 
for either offer type.
According to Grullon and Ikenberry (2000), indeed, 
research using announcements of stock repurchase via 
fixed-price tender ought to find significant increases in 
these companies’ operating performance. This is because 
this type of offer represents a stronger commitment to 
distribute cash as well as a willingness to pay a premium 
on the share price. All this makes this signaling to the 
market quite powerful.
When studies focus on announcements of open-
market stock repurchase, results are not as emphatic. 
Vermaelen (1981) says that unlike the results for fixed-
price repurchases, open-market stock repurchases 
present less conclusive results regarding the signaling 
hypothesis. Bartov (1991) says that his findings for 
open-market buybacks are just weak in indicating 
abnormal positive annual profits for the announcement 
year. A surprising result which counters expectations 
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was obtained by Grullon and Michaely (2004), who 
found a reduction in companies’ profits and profitability 
after their open-market repurchase announcements. 
Lie (2005) found results suggesting that, rather than 
repurchase announcements, it is the repurchases 
themselves that make good indicators of future 
performance improvement.
Another reason for signaling is when the company 
believes the market is not evaluating the public 
information available properly. To test this hypothesis, 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) examined the long-term 
performance of securities of companies that announced 
open-market share buyback programs from 1980 to 1990 
in the United States. They found that if an investor bought 
and held stocks of these companies in his portfolio for 
a four-year period, he would have an average abnormal 
return of 12.1% accumulated for the period. This result 
is consistent with the hypothesis that such firms were 
undervalued by the market at the time they announced 
the share buyback program. In a later study, Ikenberry 
et al. (2000) looked at open-market stock repurchase 
announcements in Canada and, again, found abnormal 
positive returns of 7% per year for an investment in these 
companies during a three-year period.
Yook (2010) compares the performance improvement 
of companies following fixed-price tenders and open-
market repurchases and finds evidence of abnormal returns 
in both cases, both for the announcement month and the 
following 36 months. Consistent with the hypothesis 
that a fixed-price tender is a more powerful signaling, 
this method showed a higher return than open-market 
repurchases by approximately 0.20% per month for the 
following 36 months. Ishikawa and Takahashi (2011) 
used Japanese data and a sample also formed by the two 
types of repurchases and found results that corroborate 
the hypothesis that managers at these companies are well 
informed and/or adept in identifying pricing errors in 
the market.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Sample and Data
The announcements of open-market repurchase 
programs that form this study’s sample were manually 
collected from the CVM information base. The 
announcements were extracted from the minutes of 
board meetings of, or material fact disclosures by the 
companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange from 
January 2003 to December 2014. We used all the open-
market repurchase announcements aimed at repurchasing 
at least 5% of outstanding shares in order to eliminate 
repurchase programs of smaller quantities, which are 
generally associated with executive stock compensation. 
We defined the announcement date as the date of 
registration of the repurchase program with the CVM, 
since, under CVM Instruction n. 10 (1980), the board of 
directors’ decision to authorize the acquisition of shares 
must be immediately reported to the CVM and the stock 
exchange where the company’s securities are traded.
The monthly data for stock return rates were calculated 
based on prices collected from the Economatica® system. 
Corporate accounting information was also obtained 
from the same system. Table 1 shows the distribution 
of repurchase announcements by year and quarter, as 
well as the average repurchase percentage announced 
in relation to total outstanding shares. Over the 12 
years analyzed, the companies announced, on average, 
repurchases of 8.94% of outstanding shares. We can see 
that the number of announcements from 2003 to 2014 
varies little, but there was a peak in 2008, when 15.8% 
of the announcements forming our sample were made. 
A large number of announcements were made in the 
fourth quarter of 2008, shortly after the height of the 
subprime crisis (Figure 1A). Quarterly data shows that 
companies usually make more announcements in the 
fourth quarter of each year, and fewer announcements 
in the first quarter.
Table 1 shows the number of repurchase programs 
announced in the CVM for companies listed on the 
stock exchange and the respective amount, as well as its 
percentage of total outstanding shares. In two cases, the 
companies did not explicitly report the total number of 
stocks to be repurchased, but declared that they would 
not violate the CVM’s limit. In this case, we assumed that 
the company could buy up to the 10% limit established 
by the norm.
Underreaction to open market share repurchases
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the announcements of open-market stock repurchase
Source: Prepared by the authors.
3.2 Portfolio Building
Studies conducted in Brazil with stock repurchase 
announcements examine what happens to short-
term returns in the days following the companies’ 
announcements (Gabrielli & Saito, 2004; Lima et al., 
2012; Moreira, 2000). In order to examine the long-
term performance of a strategy based on repurchase 
announcements in the Brazilian market, we formed 
a value-weighted portfolio and gradually added 
companies as they made their announcements. 
The firms’ shares were added to the portfolio at the 
beginning of the month following the announcement 
and were held for 36 months or until they stopped 
being traded in the stock exchange. The portfolio 
was rebalanced at the beginning of each month. This 
approach forms a series of monthly returns produced 
in a chronological or calendar succession, hence the 
term ‘calendar time approach’. It has been used by 
Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000), Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000), among others, to examine abnormal long-term 
returns after corporate events such the object of our 
study, i.e., stock repurchase announcements.
Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner 
(1997) show evidence that calculating abnormal long-
term returns using buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR) strategies can produce biased estimates. The 
bias arises, among other reasons, because BHAR tend 
to be significantly asymmetric on the right, due to the 
rebalancing of the benchmark portfolio, or because of 
the companies in the sample. Fama (1998) recommends 
building a portfolio based on calendar time, especially 
because when one builds a portfolio, all cross-correlations 
of firms’ abnormal returns are considered in the portfolio’s 
variance matrix. Over time, new companies enter the 
portfolio, just as others may leave it. This causes the 
number of firms in the portfolio to vary over the period. In 
some months, particularly at the beginning of the period 
studied, the portfolio might have just a few stocks. Thus, in 
order to reduce the impact caused by idiosyncratic noise, 
we excluded the months in which the portfolio contained 
stocks of less than eight companies. From May 2003, the 
portfolio already had eight assets. Over time, it grew to 
a peak of 72 assets in December 2010, when it began to 
decline in size, and closed the period analyzed with 55 







1 2 3 4
2003 22 8.93 2 11 3 6
2004 22 8.97 4 13 5 0
2005 20 8.45 3 8 1 8
2006 22 9.07 2 8 3 9
2007 29 9.51 5 4 10 10
2008 65 9.03 15 9 12 29
2009 26 9.30 10 5 5 6
2010 32 9.35 8 7 6 11
2011 50 9.12 7 6 19 18
2012 30 8.99 7 3 7 13
2013 49 8.37 8 5 15 21
2014 45 8.49 12 12 10 11
Total 412 8.94 83 91 96 142
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Figure 1 Announcements of open-market stock repurchase by quarter
A: the fourth quarter of 2008 has the greatest number of repurchase announcements in the sample, probably due to the 
subprime crisis; B: the size of the portfolio increases over time, but it has a significant surge during 2008 due to the crisis. The 
portfolio peaks (72 stocks) in December 2010.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
In addition to the three-year period, we calculate the 
returns for other investment horizons, including year 
1, year 2 and year 3 after the announcement date. For 
example, the Year 1 portfolio includes all companies 
that made an announcement in the previous 12 months. 
This allowed analyzing the possible abnormal return in 
different windows. We also calculated the returns for 
year -1 to see whether the portfolio already generated 
abnormal returns before the announcement was made. 
This was meant to rule out the hypothesis that the portfolio 
generated abnormal returns even before the repurchase 
program announcement.
3.3 Portfolio Performance Measurement
We estimated abnormal performance initially by using 
the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965). 
The series of monthly excess returns for the portfolio 
of stocks of companies that announced a repurchase 
was regressed against the excess returns for the market 
portfolio:
where Rp,t is the monthly return rate for the stock portfolio 
on date t, Rf,t is the risk-free rate measured as the 30-day 
DI swap on date t and RM,t is the monthly return rate for 
the market portfolio measured by the Bovespa Index 
(Ibovespa) on date t. The abnormal return is measured 
by α.
We also used the Fama and French (1993) three factor 
model to calculate abnormal return α:
1𝑅𝑅�,� − 𝑅𝑅�,� = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽��𝑅𝑅�,� − 𝑅𝑅�,�� + 𝜀𝜀� 
2𝑅𝑅�,� − 𝑅𝑅�,� = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽��𝑅𝑅�,� − 𝑅𝑅�,�� + 𝛽𝛽���𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻� + 𝛽𝛽���𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆� + 𝜀𝜀� 
where factors HMLt and SMBt are, respectively, factors 
high minus low and small minus big on date t. Factor 
HML is the return rate for a portfolio that is long on 
stocks with a high book-to-market ratio and short on 
stocks of companies with a low book-to-market ratio. 
Factor SMB is the return rate for a portfolio that is long 
on stocks with a low market value and short on stocks of 
companies with a high market value. These factors were 
extracted from the University of São Paulo’s Center for 
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4. RESULTS
4.1 General Case
Table 2 shows the results of the investment strategy for 
the value-weighted portfolio formed by companies that 
made open-market repurchase announcements. Strategy 
performance was measured using CAPM (Panel A) and 
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (Panel 
B). Assuming that the investor will buy the shares in 
the month following the repurchase announcement and 
will hold them in his portfolio for the next three years, 
CAPM indicates a positive abnormal return of 0.617% 
per month (t = 2.74), significant at 1%. Assuming that the 
investor will hold the asset for two years, the abnormal 
return would be lower, i.e., 0.441% per month (t = 1.83), 
and only significant at 10%. The abnormal returns are 
positive and significant for each of the 1-year periods 
after the announcement.
After controlling for size and book-to-market ratio in 
a three-factor model, results are qualitatively similar. The 
abnormal return observed for each of the three years is 
positive and significant, and so are the abnormal returns 
for the two- and three-year windows. The similarity 
between the abnormal returns calculated by one- and 
three-factor models is not unexpected. It is mainly due to 
the fact that additional factors are not, as a rule, statistically 
significant in Brazil (Machado & Medeiros, 2011; Noda, 
Martelanc & Kayo, 2016). In addition, the SMB factor had 
a very low premium in the sample used, i.e., approximately 
-0.55% per year. The premium for the HML factor was 
higher, i.e., 3.77% per year, but lower than the average 
market premium of 4.15% per year.
Previous evidence (Ikenberry et al., 2000; Yook, 2010) 
has documented that repurchase announcements are 
associated with negative abnormal returns for the months 
immediately prior to the announcement. This result was 
not observed in this study. The abnormal return for the 
year immediately prior to the announcement date did 
not show statistical significance.
For robustness, we calculated the abnormal return 
through four- and five-factor models, using Carhart’s 
(1997) winners minus losers factor and Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquid minus liquid factor. In both cases, results did 
not change qualitatively. In the four-factor model, we 
obtained an abnormal return of 0.733% per month (t = 
3.13) for the three-year horizon, and 0.545% per month 
(t = 2.17) for the two-year horizon. Abnormal returns 
were positive and statistically significant for each of the 
three years in the investment window. In the five-factor 
model, the abnormal return was 0.716% per month (t = 
3.05) for the three-year window, and 0.520% per month (t 
= 2.07) for the two-year window. Abnormal returns were 
also positive and significant for each of the three years 
separately. There was no case where the abnormal return 
for the 1-year window prior to the event was statistically 
significant.
We also analyzed the abnormal returns obtained by 
one-, three-, four- and five-factor models using portfolios 
built with the same stock weighting. Results remained 
qualitatively similar.
It is possible that the announcements made in the 
height of the subprime crisis, during the fourth quarter 
of 2008, derived from the widespread devaluation of 
assets rather than being related to company-specific 
information. To purge the effects of these announcements 
on abnormal return estimates, we eliminated the 29 
repurchase announcements made during that period. 
Using CAPM, the abnormal return for the three-year 
horizon was 0.664% per month (t = 2.68). The abnormal 
return was also positive and significant for the two-year 
window, as well as for each individual year. There were 
no abnormal returns for the one-year window preceding 
the event. In the results for the three-factor model, the 
investment for the three-year window generated a positive 
abnormal return of 0.658% per month (t = 2.64). We also 
obtained abnormal returns for the two-year windows, as 
well as for each individual year. There were no abnormal 
returns for the one-year window preceding the event.
The results of ordinary least square regressions 
weighted equally each observed return for the portfolio 
of companies that announced repurchase programs, 
despite the number of announcements in each month. 
It is possible that the number of announcements is 
correlated with the returns for this portfolio (Gompers 
& Lerner, 2003). If that is the case, then we will have 
heteroscedasticity problems in the regression’s residuals. 
To correct this potential problem, we estimated regressions 
through weighted least squares, using the square root of 
the number of companies in the portfolio for each month 
for weighting. The t-statistics for the intercepts increased, 
but results in general did not change qualitatively.
For a robustness analysis of these results, we calculated 
the abnormal return for the difference between the portfolio 
of companies that made repurchase announcements 
and a portfolio of companies that did not make such 
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announcements during the period studied and whose 
book-to-market and size values were similar to those of 
the repurchase sample. In order to select the control firms, 
all listed companies were separated in groups according 
to their position in relation to the thirds of the book-to-
market variable, and then in relation to the thirds of the 
size variable. For each repurchase announcement in the 
sample, a control company was randomly selected from 
those belonging to the same group of companies with 
the same book-to-market and size characteristics in the 
announcement month.
According to results in Table 3, the control sample 
had no abnormal returns for any of the periods when 
measured by CAPM, and it showed a positive abnormal 
return at the 5% level only for year 3, when measured 
by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. 
All regressions in the table were estimated through 
weighted least squares, using the square root of the 
number of companies in the portfolio for each month 
for weighting. 
We also used CAPM and the three-factor model to test 
the difference between the abnormal returns calculated for 
the repurchase and control portfolios. When measured by 
CAPM, the abnormal return for the repurchase portfolio 
is significantly higher than that for the control portfolio 
at the 5% level for the first year after the announcement 
(estimate = 0.62% per month) and significant at the 10 % 
level for year 3 (estimate = 0.66% per month) and for 
the period from years 1 through 3 (estimate = 0.44% 
per month). Using the three-factor model, the abnormal 
return for the repurchase portfolio is significantly higher 
than that for the control portfolio at the 10% level in the 
first year after the announcements (estimate = 0.51% per 
month). Estimates were made through weighted least 
squares, using the square root of the size of the portfolios 
for each month for weighting.
Table 2 
Abnormal long-term performance for the investment strategy based on announcements of open-market stock repurchase 
programs 
Note: the portfolios were formed by companies that announced the repurchase of their own shares in the open market during 
the period from January 2003 to December 2014. Over time, assets entered and left the portfolio. For the “years 1 to 3” portfolio, 
assets were included at the beginning of the month immediately following the announcement month and were held for 36 
months. Portfolios were also formed for years 1 to 2 (months 1 to 24), year -1 (months -12 to -1), year 1 (months 1 to 12), year 
2 (months 13 to 24) and year 3 (months 25-36). The abnormal return was measured using CAPM and the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model: 
The months in which the portfolio had less than eight assets were excluded from the analysis. The standard errors are presented 
in parentheses, just below the coefficient estimated.
*, **, ***: significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3
Abnormal long-term return for the control portfolio
Note: the portfolios were formed by companies similar (in terms of book-to-market ratio and size) to those which announced the 
repurchase of their own shares in the open market from January 2003 to December 2014. Over time, assets entered and left the 
portfolio according to the same criteria as in the repurchase sample. The abnormal return was measured using CAPM and Fama 
and French (1993) three-factor model:
The months in which the portfolio had less than eight assets were excluded from the analysis. The standard errors are presented 
in parentheses, just below the coefficient estimated. The estimation method was weighted least squares, using the square root of 
the number of companies in the sample for weighting.
*, **, ***: significant at the 5, 1 and 0.1% levels, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
4.2 Value vs. Growth
There can be many motivations for a company to 
announce an open-market share repurchase program. 
One of them is some degree of undervaluation of its 
stocks (underpricing). According to Ikenberry et al. (1995, 
2000), many undervalued stocks have a high book-to-
market ratio. Therefore, value-type companies would have 
undervaluation as their most important motivation to 
repurchase. Thus, one of the ways to determine whether 
undervaluation is a reason for announcing a repurchase 
program is to consider in the analysis the differences 
between companies’ book-to-market ratios. 
To investigate the motivations for the announcements, 
we calculated for each company in the sample their book-
to-market ratio for June each year. We assumed that in 
January of a given year, an investor can get information 
about the company’s book-to-market ratio for the middle 
of the previous financial year to classify it as a value or 
a growth company. At the beginning of each year, the 
investor separates the companies in these two groups 
according to the value of their rates in relation to the 
market median. For each of the groups, we estimated the 
abnormal long-term returns for the stock portfolios. Table 
4 shows the α estimates for the market-value-weighted 
portfolios. The values in parentheses are the estimates’ 
standard errors.
Value companies that announced repurchase programs 
had higher abnormal returns than growth companies 
for the different investment horizons. Differences were 
greatest for years 2 and 3. Results were essentially the 
same for CAPM and Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
model. We found no significant change using Carhart’s 
(1997) winners minus losers factor and Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquid minus liquid factor (tables not shown). Nor did 
results change when we used portfolios with the same 
weights for all stocks (tables not shown).
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Results show that both growth and value companies 
presented abnormal returns for the periods following the 
announcement. Among the possible reasons for growth 
companies to announce the repurchase of their own shares 
is, for example, an attempt to avoid profit dilution. For 
value companies, undervaluation can be a stronger reason. 
Value companies’ higher α values, particularly for years 
2 and 3, confirm this hypothesis.
To analyze the robustness of results, we used control 
samples formed by companies similar (in terms of 
market-to-book ratio and size) to those that announced 
repurchase programs in order to estimate the difference 
between the abnormal returns for the repurchase 
sample and the control sample. Using both CAPM and 
three-factor model, the repurchase sample’s abnormal 
returns were not statistically different from the control 
sample’s abnormal returns for growth firms. For value 
companies, the difference between abnormal returns for 
the repurchase sample and the control sample was positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for all estimation 
windows, the estimated difference being 1.8% per month 
for the three-year window – the three years following 
the announcement. Therefore, results corroborate that 
firms that announce a repurchase, particularly value 
firms, present positive abnormal returns for the months 
following the announcement.
Table 4
Abnormal long-term performance for an investment strategy of value vs. growth after announcements of open-market stock 
repurchase programs
Note: the portfolios were formed by companies that announced the repurchase of their own shares in the open market during 
the period from January 2003 to December 2014. Over time, assets entered and left the portfolio. For the “years 1 to 3” portfolio, 
assets were included at the beginning of the month immediately following the announcement month, and were held for 36 
months. Portfolios were also formed for years 1 to 2 (months 1 to 24), year -1 (months -12 to -1), year 1 (months 1 to 12), year 
2 (months 13 to 24) and year 3 (months 25-36). The abnormal return was measured using CAPM and Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model:
The months in which the portfolio had less than eight assets were excluded from the analysis. Only  values are shown in the 
table. The standard errors are presented in parentheses, just below the coefficient estimated.
*, **, ***: significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Financial theory says that a company’s decision to 
repurchase its own shares may be related to a number 
of factors, such as adjustments to its capital structure, 
reducing agency costs on free cash flows, as a substitute for 
dividend payment, as a means of signaling, among others.
This study found evidence that the Brazilian market 
does not react properly to the signs sent by open-market 
share repurchase announcements. Using an investment 
strategy with a horizon of up to three years and a portfolio 
with shares of companies that announced the repurchase 
Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Years 1 to 2 Years 1 to 3
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of their own shares, we found that annual abnormal 
returns ranged from 5.4 to 7.9%.
Among the possible reasons for a company to 
repurchase its own stocks is management’s perception 
that its stocks are undervalued in the market. To determine 
whether that is a plausible reason in the Brazilian market, 
the companies were divided in two groups according to 
their book-to-market ratios. Undervaluation is more 
likely to be a reason for high book-to-market companies 
(value companies) to repurchase. Several other reasons 
may be responsible for repurchase announcements by 
companies with a lower book-to-market ratio (growth 
companies). Portfolios formed by companies classified 
as value showed greater abnormal returns than those of 
companies classified as growth for the different horizons 
analyzed. These results indicate that firms’ managers are 
well informed and/or adept in identifying pricing error 
opportunities in the market. Our findings are in line with 
those of Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000) for the American and 
Canadian markets, and Ishikawa and Takahashi (2011) 
for the Japanese market.
Overall, this study presents evidence that 
announcements of open-market share repurchase 
programs provide reliable signs that the announcing 
company’s stocks are undervalued. Moreover, our results 
are inconsistent with the semi-strong form of the efficient 
markets hypothesis, which says that one cannot earn 
abnormal returns with publicly available information.
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